Unexceptional moral knowledge
The article defends moral realism against epistemological objections by arguing that if there are moral truths, some of them are known. The claim that moral properties are unknowable because causally inert is shown to be ineffective: none of the main current theories of knowledge requires a causal c...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Brill
2022
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| _version_ | 1797111008531054592 |
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| author | Williamson, T |
| author_facet | Williamson, T |
| author_sort | Williamson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The article defends moral realism against epistemological objections by arguing that if there are moral truths, some of them are known. The claim that moral properties are unknowable because causally inert is shown to be ineffective: none of the main current theories of knowledge requires a causal connection, and anyway moral properties have not been shown to be causally inert. It is explained why a posteriori moral knowledge need not derive from combining a priori moral knowledge with a posteriori non-moral knowledge. The possibility of moral knowledge by perception and by testimony is briefly defended. The role of recognitional capacities for instances of moral properties is emphasized. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:02:41Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:cc2c433d-e6ed-40c1-97fa-cda557de7b42 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:02:41Z |
| publishDate | 2022 |
| publisher | Brill |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:cc2c433d-e6ed-40c1-97fa-cda557de7b422023-10-10T08:16:50ZUnexceptional moral knowledgeJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:cc2c433d-e6ed-40c1-97fa-cda557de7b42EnglishSymplectic ElementsBrill2022Williamson, TThe article defends moral realism against epistemological objections by arguing that if there are moral truths, some of them are known. The claim that moral properties are unknowable because causally inert is shown to be ineffective: none of the main current theories of knowledge requires a causal connection, and anyway moral properties have not been shown to be causally inert. It is explained why a posteriori moral knowledge need not derive from combining a priori moral knowledge with a posteriori non-moral knowledge. The possibility of moral knowledge by perception and by testimony is briefly defended. The role of recognitional capacities for instances of moral properties is emphasized. |
| spellingShingle | Williamson, T Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title | Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title_full | Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title_fullStr | Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title_full_unstemmed | Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title_short | Unexceptional moral knowledge |
| title_sort | unexceptional moral knowledge |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT williamsont unexceptionalmoralknowledge |