Sharp thresholds limit the benefit of defector avoidance in cooperation on networks
Consider a cooperation game on a spatial network of habitat patches, where players can relocate between patches if they judge the local conditions to be unfavorable. In time, the relocation events may lead to a homogeneous state where all patches harbor the same relative densities of cooperators and...
Main Authors: | Fahimipour, AK, Zeng, F, Homer, M, Traulsen, A, Levin, SA, Gross, T |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
National Academy of Sciences
2022
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