Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions
The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. (1991). <em>How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life</em>. New York: The Free Press.]. the influence of such motivational factors on delu...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2007
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| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1826297213740908544 |
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| author | McKay, R Langdon, R Coltheart, M |
| author_facet | McKay, R Langdon, R Coltheart, M |
| author_sort | McKay, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. (1991). <em>How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life</em>. New York: The Free Press.]. the influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological <em>misbelief</em>, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the <em>motivational</em> and the <em>deficit</em>. Motivational approaches view delusions as extreme instances of self-deception; as defensive attempts to relieve pain and distress. Deficit approaches, in contrast, view delusions as the consequence of defects in the normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities. It is argued that although there are good reasons to be sceptical of motivational theories (particularly in their more floridly psychodynamic manifestations), recent experiments confirm that motives are important causal forces where delusions are concerned. It is therefore concluded that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both motivational and deficit approaches. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:28:09Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:cd5e123e-d9fc-4174-90df-425211a6b2c9 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:28:09Z |
| publishDate | 2007 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:cd5e123e-d9fc-4174-90df-425211a6b2c92022-03-27T07:28:15ZModels of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusionsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:cd5e123e-d9fc-4174-90df-425211a6b2c9AnthropologyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetElsevier2007McKay, RLangdon, RColtheart, MThe impact of our desires and preferences upon our ordinary, everyday beliefs is well-documented [Gilovich, T. (1991). <em>How we know what isn't so: The fallibility of human reason in everyday life</em>. New York: The Free Press.]. the influence of such motivational factors on delusions, which are instances of pathological <em>misbelief</em>, has tended however to be neglected by certain prevailing models of delusion formation and maintenance. This paper explores a distinction between two general classes of theoretical explanation for delusions; the <em>motivational</em> and the <em>deficit</em>. Motivational approaches view delusions as extreme instances of self-deception; as defensive attempts to relieve pain and distress. Deficit approaches, in contrast, view delusions as the consequence of defects in the normal functioning of belief mechanisms, underpinned by neuroanatomical or neurophysiological abnormalities. It is argued that although there are good reasons to be sceptical of motivational theories (particularly in their more floridly psychodynamic manifestations), recent experiments confirm that motives are important causal forces where delusions are concerned. It is therefore concluded that the most comprehensive account of delusions will involve a theoretical unification of both motivational and deficit approaches. |
| spellingShingle | Anthropology McKay, R Langdon, R Coltheart, M Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title | Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title_full | Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title_fullStr | Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title_full_unstemmed | Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title_short | Models of misbelief: integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| title_sort | models of misbelief integrating motivational and deficit theories of delusions |
| topic | Anthropology |
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