Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.

The single crossing property plays a crucial role in monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), yet in some important applications the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum of two functions...

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Main Authors: Quah, J, Strulovici, B
Format: Working paper
Language:English
Published: Department of Economics (University of Oxford) 2010
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author Quah, J
Strulovici, B
author_facet Quah, J
Strulovici, B
author_sort Quah, J
collection OXFORD
description The single crossing property plays a crucial role in monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), yet in some important applications the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum of two functions with the single crossing property need not have the same property. We obtain the precise conditions under which functions with the single crossing property add up to functions with this property. We apply our results to certain Bayesian games when establishing the monotonicity of strategies is an important step in proving equilibrium existence. In particular, we find conditions under which first-price auctions have monotone equilibria, generalizing the result of Reny and Zamir (2004).
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spelling oxford-uuid:cde17507-d3c7-4644-badd-6cd0b1ae8b7f2022-03-27T07:31:44ZAggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:cde17507-d3c7-4644-badd-6cd0b1ae8b7fEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2010Quah, JStrulovici, BThe single crossing property plays a crucial role in monotone comparative statics (Milgrom and Shannon (1994)), yet in some important applications the property cannot be directly assumed or easily derived. Difficulties often arise because the property cannot be aggregated: the sum of two functions with the single crossing property need not have the same property. We obtain the precise conditions under which functions with the single crossing property add up to functions with this property. We apply our results to certain Bayesian games when establishing the monotonicity of strategies is an important step in proving equilibrium existence. In particular, we find conditions under which first-price auctions have monotone equilibria, generalizing the result of Reny and Zamir (2004).
spellingShingle Quah, J
Strulovici, B
Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title_full Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title_fullStr Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title_full_unstemmed Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title_short Aggregating the single crossing property: theory and applications to comparative statics and Bayesian games.
title_sort aggregating the single crossing property theory and applications to comparative statics and bayesian games
work_keys_str_mv AT quahj aggregatingthesinglecrossingpropertytheoryandapplicationstocomparativestaticsandbayesiangames
AT strulovicib aggregatingthesinglecrossingpropertytheoryandapplicationstocomparativestaticsandbayesiangames