Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects
Previous studies identified several domestic factors that may influence a country’s level of structural coup-proofing, i.e., counterbalancing strategies that shall prevent internal groups from seizing power via a coup d’état. We suggest that a country’s level of counterbalancing is also affected by...
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Published: |
Cambridge University Press
2015
|
| _version_ | 1826297383128924160 |
|---|---|
| author | Ruggeri, A Böhmelt, T Pilster, U |
| author_facet | Ruggeri, A Böhmelt, T Pilster, U |
| author_sort | Ruggeri, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Previous studies identified several domestic factors that may influence a country’s level of structural coup-proofing, i.e., counterbalancing strategies that shall prevent internal groups from seizing power via a coup d’état. We suggest that a country’s level of counterbalancing is also affected by such policies in what we term countries’ “peer groups.” When deciding the appropriate level of counterbalancing, rulers may be affected by external information flows from a “peer group” with similar structural coup-risk characteristics (institutions) or a similar coup-risk experience (coup history). Using maximum likelihood spatial lag models and data in 1976–2005, we find that leaders learn from and emulate counterbalancing in other states, but rather only through an “experiential peer group.” |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:30:46Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ce3aeee6-2e35-418f-acf2-44c16b733983 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:30:46Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ce3aeee6-2e35-418f-acf2-44c16b7339832022-03-27T07:34:18ZCounterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effectsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ce3aeee6-2e35-418f-acf2-44c16b733983Symplectic Elements at OxfordCambridge University Press2015Ruggeri, ABöhmelt, TPilster, UPrevious studies identified several domestic factors that may influence a country’s level of structural coup-proofing, i.e., counterbalancing strategies that shall prevent internal groups from seizing power via a coup d’état. We suggest that a country’s level of counterbalancing is also affected by such policies in what we term countries’ “peer groups.” When deciding the appropriate level of counterbalancing, rulers may be affected by external information flows from a “peer group” with similar structural coup-risk characteristics (institutions) or a similar coup-risk experience (coup history). Using maximum likelihood spatial lag models and data in 1976–2005, we find that leaders learn from and emulate counterbalancing in other states, but rather only through an “experiential peer group.” |
| spellingShingle | Ruggeri, A Böhmelt, T Pilster, U Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title | Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title_full | Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title_fullStr | Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title_full_unstemmed | Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title_short | Counterbalancing, spatial dependence, and peer group effects |
| title_sort | counterbalancing spatial dependence and peer group effects |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT ruggeria counterbalancingspatialdependenceandpeergroupeffects AT bohmeltt counterbalancingspatialdependenceandpeergroupeffects AT pilsteru counterbalancingspatialdependenceandpeergroupeffects |