The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note.
This note extends the analysis of M. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers (1996) to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost; that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Blackwell Publishing
1998
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| _version_ | 1797095795708657664 |
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| author | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_facet | Armstrong, M Vickers, J |
| author_sort | Armstrong, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This note extends the analysis of M. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers (1996) to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost; that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the efficient component pricing rule; and that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price, rather than the margin, is regulated. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:33:02Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:cef96ba1-3c22-4a0a-943a-200d916a7749 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T04:33:02Z |
| publishDate | 1998 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:cef96ba1-3c22-4a0a-943a-200d916a77492022-03-27T07:39:18ZThe Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:cef96ba1-3c22-4a0a-943a-200d916a7749EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsBlackwell Publishing1998Armstrong, MVickers, JThis note extends the analysis of M. Armstrong, C. Doyle, and J. Vickers (1996) to the case of retail price deregulation. It is shown that the optimal access price may be above, below, or (in the linear case) equal to marginal cost; that optimal regulation of the margin between the retail price and the access price entails the efficient component pricing rule; and that welfare and entrant profit are higher when the level of the access price, rather than the margin, is regulated. |
| spellingShingle | Armstrong, M Vickers, J The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title | The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title_full | The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title_fullStr | The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title_full_unstemmed | The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title_short | The Access Pricing Problem with Deregulation: A Note. |
| title_sort | access pricing problem with deregulation a note |
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