Time consistency, learning by doing and infant-industry protection: the linear case
This paper examines the implications for strategic trade policy of different assumptions about precommitment in a dynamic oligopoly game with learning by doing. Assuming that demands are linear, we find that the optimal first-period subsidy is increasing in the rate of learning with precommitment bu...
Main Authors: | Leahy, D, Neary, J |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Economic & Social Research Institute
1994
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