| 總結: | <p>This thesis examines the intersections of development and security in the implementation of infrastructure projects in Colombia. The study of infrastructure in armed conflict largely focuses on its potential to deliver security through statebuilding and tends to only examine armed groups when they target infrastructure to undermine state presence in the territory. Yet, armed groups and states also cooperate, coopt, or coexist during and after internal armed conflict. Without incorporating these interactions, we lack a complete picture on how development impacts security.</p>
<p>I build a theoretical framework to show four interactions between the state and armed group during infrastructure implementation on a spectrum between competition and cooperation. Depending on the interaction, the state and armed group use distinct territorial strategies to secure their presence that shape the local order. I develop this theoretical framework through a grounded approach, employing a most-similar subnational research design to examine state-led infrastructure implementation in areas occupied by armed groups in Colombia. Drawing from 82 interviews in the regions of Northern Antioquia and Pacific Nariño, I process trace the local impact of state and armed group interactions during infrastructure through the mechanism of territorial strategies. </p>
<p>By applying an infrastructural lens to armed conflict, I show that the most insecure local orders are at both ends of the spectrum: extreme competition and close cooperation. When the state and armed group are in the mid-range of the cooperative end of the spectrum, their territorial strategy produces security. Yet I show that development – through infrastructure implementation – produces security and agency only when the state and armed group are in competition, not cooperation. </p>
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