Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.

The neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals, yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members. This paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member. We make minimal assumptions about how the individua...

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Main Authors: Browning, M, Chiappori, P
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Econometric Society 1998
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author Browning, M
Chiappori, P
author_facet Browning, M
Chiappori, P
author_sort Browning, M
collection OXFORD
description The neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals, yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members. This paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member. We make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts. All we assume is that however decisions are made, outcomes are efficient. We refer to this as the collective setting. We show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the Slutsky matrix. We also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made. We apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from Canada. The tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two-person households but not for one-person households. We also show that income pooling is rejected for two-person households. We then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data. None of the collective setting restrictions are rejected. We conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior.
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spelling oxford-uuid:d0bce5ad-f966-4c78-ab98-0c4b0f723f252022-03-27T07:52:02ZEfficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:d0bce5ad-f966-4c78-ab98-0c4b0f723f25EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsEconometric Society1998Browning, MChiappori, PThe neoclassical theory of demand applies to individuals, yet in empirical work it is usually taken as valid for households with many members. This paper explores what the theory of individuals implies for households that have more than one member. We make minimal assumptions about how the individual members of the household resolve conflicts. All we assume is that however decisions are made, outcomes are efficient. We refer to this as the collective setting. We show that in the collective setting household demands must satisfy a symmetry and rank condition on the Slutsky matrix. We also present some further results on the effects on demands of variables that do not modify preferences but that do affect how decisions are made. We apply our theory to a series of surveys of household expenditures from Canada. The tests of the usual symmetry conditions are rejected for two-person households but not for one-person households. We also show that income pooling is rejected for two-person households. We then test for our collective setting conditions on the couples data. None of the collective setting restrictions are rejected. We conclude that the collective setting is a plausible and tractable next step to take in the analysis of household behavior.
spellingShingle Browning, M
Chiappori, P
Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title_full Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title_fullStr Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title_full_unstemmed Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title_short Efficient Intra-household Allocations: A General Characterization and Empirical Tests.
title_sort efficient intra household allocations a general characterization and empirical tests
work_keys_str_mv AT browningm efficientintrahouseholdallocationsageneralcharacterizationandempiricaltests
AT chiapporip efficientintrahouseholdallocationsageneralcharacterizationandempiricaltests