The Complexity of Safe Manipulation under Scoring Rules
Κύριοι συγγραφείς: | Ianovski, E, Yu, L, Elkind, E, Wilson, M |
---|---|
Μορφή: | Conference item |
Έκδοση: |
2011
|
Παρόμοια τεκμήρια
-
On manipulation in multi−winner elections based on scoring rules
ανά: Obraztsova, S, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2013) -
Social choice under metric preferences: scoring rules and STV
ανά: Skowron, P, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2017) -
Complexity of mixed equilibria in boolean games
ανά: Ianovski, E
Έκδοση: (2016) -
Campaign management under approval-driven voting rules
ανά: Schlotter, I, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2015) -
The complexity of decision problems about equilibria in two-player Boolean games
ανά: Ianovski, E, κ.ά.
Έκδοση: (2018)