Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
This paper investigates relational incentive contracts with continuous, privately-observed agent types that are persistent over time. With fixed agent types, full separation is not possible when continuation equilibrium payoffs following revelation are on the Pareto frontier of attainable payoffs. T...
Hoofdauteur: | Malcomson, J |
---|---|
Formaat: | Journal article |
Gepubliceerd in: |
Wiley
2015
|
Gelijkaardige items
-
Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
door: Malcomson, J
Gepubliceerd in: (2012) -
Relational Incentive Contracts.
door: Malcomson, J
Gepubliceerd in: (2010) -
Relational incentive contracts
door: Malcomson, J
Gepubliceerd in: (2010) -
Relational incentive contracts
door: Malcomson, J
Gepubliceerd in: (2013) -
Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
door: Malcomson, J
Gepubliceerd in: (2015)