Descriptions, ambiguity, and representationalist theories of interpretation
<p>Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between <i>de re</i>, <i>de dicto</i>, and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes though...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Springer Verlag
2011
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| Summary: | <p>Theories of descriptions tend to involve commitments about the ambiguity of descriptions. For example, sentences containing descriptions are widely taken to be ambiguous between <i>de re</i>, <i>de dicto</i>, and intermediate interpretations and are sometimes thought to be ambiguous between the former and directly referential interpretations. I provide arguments to suggest that none of these interpretations are due to ambiguities (or indexicality). On the other hand, I argue that descriptions <i>are</i> ambiguous between the above family of interpretations and what may be called 'institutional' as well as generic interpretations. My arguments suggest that an adequate theory of descriptions may require considerable rethinking. Most contemporary theories of descriptions appear to be committed to one or more claims about the ambiguity of descriptions that I reject in this paper. I suggest that my observations provide a reason to renew efforts to develop a theory of descriptions within a representationalist theory of interpretation.</p> |
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