Computing a small agreeable set of indivisible items
We study the problem of assigning a small subset of indivisible items to a group of agents so that the subset is agreeable to all agents, meaning that all agents value the subset as least as much as its complement. For an arbitrary number of agents and items, we derive a tight worst-case bound on th...
| Những tác giả chính: | , |
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| Định dạng: | Journal article |
| Được phát hành: |
Elsevier
2018
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Những quyển sách tương tự
Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
Bằng: Segal-Halevi, E, et al.
Được phát hành: (2018)
Bằng: Segal-Halevi, E, et al.
Được phát hành: (2018)