Equilibrium design for concurrent games
In game theory, mechanism design is concerned with the design of incentives so that a desired outcome of the game can be achieved. In this paper, we study the design of incentives so that a desirable equilibrium is obtained, for instance, an equilibrium satisfying a given temporal logic property—a p...
主要な著者: | Gutierrez, J, Najib, M, Perelli, G, Wooldridge, M |
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フォーマット: | Conference item |
出版事項: |
Schloss Dagstuhl
2019
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