Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission.
This paper o¤ers a simple but rich framework to study communication subject to various constraints such as anonymity requirements, equal treatment of multiple agents, overcon…dence of an expert, and garbling, by extending the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Common to these seemingly d...
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| Format: | Working paper |
| Language: | English |
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Department of Economics (University of Oxford)
2006
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| _version_ | 1826299410560057344 |
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| author | Kawamura, K |
| author_facet | Kawamura, K |
| author_sort | Kawamura, K |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper o¤ers a simple but rich framework to study communication subject to various constraints such as anonymity requirements, equal treatment of multiple agents, overcon…dence of an expert, and garbling, by extending the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Common to these seemingly distinct types of constraints in communication is that the action by a decision maker is less sensitive to a message than without such constraints. Reduced sensitivity can alter the structure of informative equilibria dramatically, and leads to a type of informational distortion, termed incentives to exaggerate, which differs qualitatively from the well-known incentives to overstate/understate. We demonstrate that the two di¤erent types of distortion may partly o¤set each other, so the introduction of the constraints may be bene…cial when the level of confict between communicating parties is large. Our model can also be applied to study communication in public good provision where equal treatment is often implicitly assumed. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:01:31Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:d870d606-d27d-4d95-9a2a-34331ca08b5f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:01:31Z |
| publishDate | 2006 |
| publisher | Department of Economics (University of Oxford) |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:d870d606-d27d-4d95-9a2a-34331ca08b5f2022-03-27T08:48:36ZAnonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission.Working paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:d870d606-d27d-4d95-9a2a-34331ca08b5fEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetDepartment of Economics (University of Oxford)2006Kawamura, KThis paper o¤ers a simple but rich framework to study communication subject to various constraints such as anonymity requirements, equal treatment of multiple agents, overcon…dence of an expert, and garbling, by extending the cheap talk model of Crawford and Sobel (1982). Common to these seemingly distinct types of constraints in communication is that the action by a decision maker is less sensitive to a message than without such constraints. Reduced sensitivity can alter the structure of informative equilibria dramatically, and leads to a type of informational distortion, termed incentives to exaggerate, which differs qualitatively from the well-known incentives to overstate/understate. We demonstrate that the two di¤erent types of distortion may partly o¤set each other, so the introduction of the constraints may be bene…cial when the level of confict between communicating parties is large. Our model can also be applied to study communication in public good provision where equal treatment is often implicitly assumed. |
| spellingShingle | Kawamura, K Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title | Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title_full | Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title_fullStr | Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title_short | Anonymity, Equal Treatment, and Overconfidence: Constraints on Communication May Enhance Information Transmission. |
| title_sort | anonymity equal treatment and overconfidence constraints on communication may enhance information transmission |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT kawamurak anonymityequaltreatmentandoverconfidenceconstraintsoncommunicationmayenhanceinformationtransmission |