Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective.
In static principal-agent relationships, cooperation and competition among agents both yield higher welfare than independent compensation - both modes of job design improve the tradeoff between risk and explicit incentives. In dynamic settings, welfare is also affected by implicit incentives, in par...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Elsevier
1995
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| _version_ | 1797097893183619072 |
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| author | Meyer, M |
| author_facet | Meyer, M |
| author_sort | Meyer, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In static principal-agent relationships, cooperation and competition among agents both yield higher welfare than independent compensation - both modes of job design improve the tradeoff between risk and explicit incentives. In dynamic settings, welfare is also affected by implicit incentives, in particular, the ratchet effect. I characterize the effects of job design decisions on implicit incentives, showing that they differ in nature from explicit incentive effects and may be the dominant ones. Even if a decision about job design improves the static risk/incentive tradeoff, it may worsen the ratchet effect by so much that welfare falls. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:01:48Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:d8843531-e9dc-4532-8da8-ca474e04dbd6 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:01:48Z |
| publishDate | 1995 |
| publisher | Elsevier |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:d8843531-e9dc-4532-8da8-ca474e04dbd62022-03-27T08:49:20ZCooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:d8843531-e9dc-4532-8da8-ca474e04dbd6EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsElsevier1995Meyer, MIn static principal-agent relationships, cooperation and competition among agents both yield higher welfare than independent compensation - both modes of job design improve the tradeoff between risk and explicit incentives. In dynamic settings, welfare is also affected by implicit incentives, in particular, the ratchet effect. I characterize the effects of job design decisions on implicit incentives, showing that they differ in nature from explicit incentive effects and may be the dominant ones. Even if a decision about job design improves the static risk/incentive tradeoff, it may worsen the ratchet effect by so much that welfare falls. |
| spellingShingle | Meyer, M Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title | Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title_full | Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title_fullStr | Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title_short | Cooperation and Competition in Organizations: A Dynamic Perspective. |
| title_sort | cooperation and competition in organizations a dynamic perspective |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT meyerm cooperationandcompetitioninorganizationsadynamicperspective |