Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?
We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive...
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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American Economic Association
2009
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author | Bulow, J Klemperer, P |
author_facet | Bulow, J Klemperer, P |
author_sort | Bulow, J |
collection | OXFORD |
description | We compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:03:34Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:d9251c6c-a549-4aaa-ab4e-960ca9ad827f |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:03:34Z |
publishDate | 2009 |
publisher | American Economic Association |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:d9251c6c-a549-4aaa-ab4e-960ca9ad827f2022-03-27T08:53:47ZWhy Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions?Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:d9251c6c-a549-4aaa-ab4e-960ca9ad827fEnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrintsAmerican Economic Association2009Bulow, JKlemperer, PWe compare the most common methods for selling a company or other asset when participation is costly: a simple simultaneous auction, and a sequential process in which potential buyers decide in turn whether or not to enter the bidding. The sequential process is always more efficient. But pre-emptive bids transfer surplus from the seller to buyers. Because the auction is more conducive to entry - precisely because of its inefficiency - it usually generates higher expected revenue. We also discuss the effects of lock-ups, matching rights, break-up fees (as in takeover battles), entry subsidies, etc. |
spellingShingle | Bulow, J Klemperer, P Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title | Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title_full | Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title_fullStr | Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title_full_unstemmed | Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title_short | Why Do Sellers (Usually) Prefer Auctions? |
title_sort | why do sellers usually prefer auctions |
work_keys_str_mv | AT bulowj whydosellersusuallypreferauctions AT klempererp whydosellersusuallypreferauctions |