Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem
In a novel multiplayer extension of the famous secretary problem, multiple players seek to employ secretaries from a common labour pool. Secretaries do not accept being put on hold, always accept job offers immediately, and leave the labour pool once rejected by a single player. All players have an...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2014
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| _version_ | 1797098151107100672 |
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| author | Cownden, D Steinsaltz, D |
| author_facet | Cownden, D Steinsaltz, D |
| author_sort | Cownden, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | In a novel multiplayer extension of the famous secretary problem, multiple players seek to employ secretaries from a common labour pool. Secretaries do not accept being put on hold, always accept job offers immediately, and leave the labour pool once rejected by a single player. All players have an identical preference for secretaries, and all players seek to optimize the probability of obtaining the best of all n secretaries. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, as the number, N, of players searching the labour pool grows, the optimal strategy converges to a simple function of N. For the two-player case we also compute how much players can gain through cooperation and how the optimal strategy changes under a payoff structure that promotes spite. © 2014 INFORMS. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:05:34Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:d9cb6bb2-6789-44a8-9013-98ec931d510e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:05:34Z |
| publishDate | 2014 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:d9cb6bb2-6789-44a8-9013-98ec931d510e2022-03-27T08:58:31ZEffects of Competition in a Secretary ProblemJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:d9cb6bb2-6789-44a8-9013-98ec931d510eEnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2014Cownden, DSteinsaltz, DIn a novel multiplayer extension of the famous secretary problem, multiple players seek to employ secretaries from a common labour pool. Secretaries do not accept being put on hold, always accept job offers immediately, and leave the labour pool once rejected by a single player. All players have an identical preference for secretaries, and all players seek to optimize the probability of obtaining the best of all n secretaries. We find that in the Nash equilibrium, as the number, N, of players searching the labour pool grows, the optimal strategy converges to a simple function of N. For the two-player case we also compute how much players can gain through cooperation and how the optimal strategy changes under a payoff structure that promotes spite. © 2014 INFORMS. |
| spellingShingle | Cownden, D Steinsaltz, D Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title | Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title_full | Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title_fullStr | Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title_full_unstemmed | Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title_short | Effects of Competition in a Secretary Problem |
| title_sort | effects of competition in a secretary problem |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT cowndend effectsofcompetitioninasecretaryproblem AT steinsaltzd effectsofcompetitioninasecretaryproblem |