Oligopolistic competition and search without priors

In this article, I examine a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search for prices but have no knowledge of the underlying price distribution. The consumers' behaviour satisfies four consistency requirements and, as a result, their beliefs about the underlying distribution max...

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Main Author: Parakhonyak, A
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Oxford University Press 2014
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author Parakhonyak, A
author_facet Parakhonyak, A
author_sort Parakhonyak, A
collection OXFORD
description In this article, I examine a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search for prices but have no knowledge of the underlying price distribution. The consumers' behaviour satisfies four consistency requirements and, as a result, their beliefs about the underlying distribution maximise Shannon entropy. I derive the optimal stopping rule and equilibrium price distribution of the model. Unlike in Stahl (1989), the expected price is decreasing in the number of firms. Moreover, consumers can benefit from being uninformed, if the number of firms is sufficiently large.
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spelling oxford-uuid:da343eca-bdf9-4825-bed7-a6294e9fc86b2022-03-27T09:01:28ZOligopolistic competition and search without priorsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:da343eca-bdf9-4825-bed7-a6294e9fc86bEnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2014Parakhonyak, AIn this article, I examine a model of oligopolistic competition in which consumers search for prices but have no knowledge of the underlying price distribution. The consumers' behaviour satisfies four consistency requirements and, as a result, their beliefs about the underlying distribution maximise Shannon entropy. I derive the optimal stopping rule and equilibrium price distribution of the model. Unlike in Stahl (1989), the expected price is decreasing in the number of firms. Moreover, consumers can benefit from being uninformed, if the number of firms is sufficiently large.
spellingShingle Parakhonyak, A
Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title_full Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title_fullStr Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title_full_unstemmed Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title_short Oligopolistic competition and search without priors
title_sort oligopolistic competition and search without priors
work_keys_str_mv AT parakhonyaka oligopolisticcompetitionandsearchwithoutpriors