Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel...
| Main Authors: | , , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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2010
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| _version_ | 1797098577171841024 |
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| author | Kümmerli, R Burton-Chellew, M Ross-Gillespie, A West, SA |
| author_facet | Kümmerli, R Burton-Chellew, M Ross-Gillespie, A West, SA |
| author_sort | Kümmerli, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:11:35Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:dbbdccd1-38a6-4ae5-9ff6-885bd1cc05d7 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:11:35Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:dbbdccd1-38a6-4ae5-9ff6-885bd1cc05d72022-03-27T09:12:42ZResistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:dbbdccd1-38a6-4ae5-9ff6-885bd1cc05d7EnglishSymplectic Elements at Oxford2010Kümmerli, RBurton-Chellew, MRoss-Gillespie, AWest, SAThe results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel evolutionary explanation. However, in previous games, imperfect behavior would automatically lead to an increase in cooperation, making it impossible to decouple any form of mistake or error from prosocial cooperative decisions. Here we empirically test between these alternatives by decoupling imperfect behavior from prosocial preferences in modified versions of the public goods game, in which individuals would maximize their selfish gain by completely (100%) cooperating. We found that, although this led to higher levels of cooperation, it did not lead to full cooperation, and individuals still perceived their group mates as competitors. This is inconsistent with either selfish or prosocial preferences, suggesting that the most parsimonious explanation is imperfect behavior triggered by psychological drives that can prevent both complete defection and complete cooperation. More generally, our results illustrate the caution that must be exercised when interpreting the evolutionary implications of economic experiments, especially the absolute level of cooperation in a particular treatment. |
| spellingShingle | Kümmerli, R Burton-Chellew, M Ross-Gillespie, A West, SA Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title | Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title_full | Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title_fullStr | Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title_short | Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games. |
| title_sort | resistance to extreme strategies rather than prosocial preferences can explain human cooperation in public goods games |
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