Resistance to extreme strategies, rather than prosocial preferences, can explain human cooperation in public goods games.
The results of numerous economic games suggest that humans behave more cooperatively than would be expected if they were maximizing selfish interests. It has been argued that this is because individuals gain satisfaction from the success of others, and that such prosocial preferences require a novel...
Main Authors: | Kümmerli, R, Burton-Chellew, M, Ross-Gillespie, A, West, SA |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2010
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