Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade

Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sell...

Full description

Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Delacrétaz, D, Loertscher, S, Marx, L, Wilkening, T
Format: Journal article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2018
_version_ 1826300101930254336
author Delacrétaz, D
Loertscher, S
Marx, L
Wilkening, T
author_facet Delacrétaz, D
Loertscher, S
Marx, L
Wilkening, T
author_sort Delacrétaz, D
collection OXFORD
description Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as an assignment game and impossibility obtains through a generalization of Shapley's (1962) result that buyers and sellers are complements. We introduce a general family of payoff functions that ensures decomposability and thus impossibility.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T05:12:02Z
format Journal article
id oxford-uuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e5
institution University of Oxford
language English
last_indexed 2024-03-07T05:12:02Z
publishDate 2018
publisher Elsevier
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e52022-03-27T09:13:51ZTwo-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient tradeJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e5EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2018Delacrétaz, DLoertscher, SMarx, LWilkening, TPrevious literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as an assignment game and impossibility obtains through a generalization of Shapley's (1962) result that buyers and sellers are complements. We introduce a general family of payoff functions that ensures decomposability and thus impossibility.
spellingShingle Delacrétaz, D
Loertscher, S
Marx, L
Wilkening, T
Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title_full Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title_fullStr Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title_full_unstemmed Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title_short Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
title_sort two sided allocation problems decomposability and the impossibility of efficient trade
work_keys_str_mv AT delacretazd twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade
AT loertschers twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade
AT marxl twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade
AT wilkeningt twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade