Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade
Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sell...
Main Authors: | , , , |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
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Elsevier
2018
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_version_ | 1826300101930254336 |
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author | Delacrétaz, D Loertscher, S Marx, L Wilkening, T |
author_facet | Delacrétaz, D Loertscher, S Marx, L Wilkening, T |
author_sort | Delacrétaz, D |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Previous literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as an assignment game and impossibility obtains through a generalization of Shapley's (1962) result that buyers and sellers are complements. We introduce a general family of payoff functions that ensures decomposability and thus impossibility. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:12:02Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e5 |
institution | University of Oxford |
language | English |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:12:02Z |
publishDate | 2018 |
publisher | Elsevier |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e52022-03-27T09:13:51ZTwo-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient tradeJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:dbe4459b-ba8c-495d-8fa6-a553276858e5EnglishSymplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2018Delacrétaz, DLoertscher, SMarx, LWilkening, TPrevious literature has shown that private information is a transaction cost that prevents efficient reallocation in two-sided setups with bilateral trade or homogeneous goods. We derive conditions under which the impossibility of efficient trade extends to rich environments in which buyers and sellers have multi-dimensional private types, accommodating many-to-many trades and heterogeneous objects. If agents can be decomposed into unit constituents, the allocation problem can be represented as an assignment game and impossibility obtains through a generalization of Shapley's (1962) result that buyers and sellers are complements. We introduce a general family of payoff functions that ensures decomposability and thus impossibility. |
spellingShingle | Delacrétaz, D Loertscher, S Marx, L Wilkening, T Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title | Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title_full | Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title_fullStr | Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title_full_unstemmed | Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title_short | Two-sided allocation problems, decomposability, and the impossibility of efficient trade |
title_sort | two sided allocation problems decomposability and the impossibility of efficient trade |
work_keys_str_mv | AT delacretazd twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade AT loertschers twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade AT marxl twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade AT wilkeningt twosidedallocationproblemsdecomposabilityandtheimpossibilityofefficienttrade |