Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics
<p style="text-align:justify;"> I begin this paper by orienting Michael Dummett's work in relation to what Adrian Moore identifies as the central concern of metaphysics: making sense of things. The metaphysical issue that most exercises Dummett is the adjudication between a rea...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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University of Arkansas Press
2015
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| _version_ | 1797098835917406208 |
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| author | Avramides, A |
| author_facet | Avramides, A |
| author_sort | Avramides, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p style="text-align:justify;"> I begin this paper by orienting Michael Dummett's work in relation to what Adrian Moore identifies as the central concern of metaphysics: making sense of things. The metaphysical issue that most exercises Dummett is the adjudication between a realist and an antirealist conception of reality, and he believes that it is by careful attention to theories of meaning that we can come to see difficulties for a realist metaphysics. Fregean realism gives way to Dummettian antirealism. But Moore is not convinced. While Dummett connects truth with our capacity to know, Moore challenges Dummett to say more about this capacity. Moore accuses Dummett of attempting, with his theory of meaning, to identify limits to our sense-making. As well as running into trouble with (what he identifies as) the limit argument, Moore believes that there may also be a lurking conservatism in Dummett's work insofar as it can be accused of making no provision for radical conceptual innovation in metaphysics. I attempt to defend Dummett against both criticisms. </p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:15:22Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:dcfdc270-945b-400f-8f36-3ff6a1ffe269 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:15:22Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | University of Arkansas Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:dcfdc270-945b-400f-8f36-3ff6a1ffe2692022-03-27T09:21:47ZDummett: the logical basis of metaphysicsJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:dcfdc270-945b-400f-8f36-3ff6a1ffe269Symplectic Elements at OxfordUniversity of Arkansas Press2015Avramides, A <p style="text-align:justify;"> I begin this paper by orienting Michael Dummett's work in relation to what Adrian Moore identifies as the central concern of metaphysics: making sense of things. The metaphysical issue that most exercises Dummett is the adjudication between a realist and an antirealist conception of reality, and he believes that it is by careful attention to theories of meaning that we can come to see difficulties for a realist metaphysics. Fregean realism gives way to Dummettian antirealism. But Moore is not convinced. While Dummett connects truth with our capacity to know, Moore challenges Dummett to say more about this capacity. Moore accuses Dummett of attempting, with his theory of meaning, to identify limits to our sense-making. As well as running into trouble with (what he identifies as) the limit argument, Moore believes that there may also be a lurking conservatism in Dummett's work insofar as it can be accused of making no provision for radical conceptual innovation in metaphysics. I attempt to defend Dummett against both criticisms. </p> |
| spellingShingle | Avramides, A Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title | Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title_full | Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title_fullStr | Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title_full_unstemmed | Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title_short | Dummett: the logical basis of metaphysics |
| title_sort | dummett the logical basis of metaphysics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT avramidesa dummettthelogicalbasisofmetaphysics |