On the logic of values
This article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and &qu...
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| Fformat: | Journal article |
| Iaith: | English |
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Penn State University Press
2010
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| _version_ | 1826300386188722176 |
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| author | Dries, M |
| author_facet | Dries, M |
| author_sort | Dries, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and "bindingness" based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values. I propose a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that requires a value to be both true and false as well as neither true nor false. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:16:22Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:dd54ab8f-36cb-4518-b26a-bca2bc030dcb |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:16:22Z |
| publishDate | 2010 |
| publisher | Penn State University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:dd54ab8f-36cb-4518-b26a-bca2bc030dcb2022-03-27T09:24:19ZOn the logic of valuesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:dd54ab8f-36cb-4518-b26a-bca2bc030dcbEthics (Moral philosophy)Practical ethicsLogicPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetPenn State University Press2010Dries, MThis article argues that Nietzsche's transvaluation project refers not to a mere inversion or negation of a set of values but, instead, to a different conception of what a value is and how it functions. Traditional values function within a standard logical framework and claim legitimacy and "bindingness" based on exogenous authority with absolute extension. Nietzsche regards this framework as unnecessarily reductive in its attempted exclusion of contradiction and real opposition among competing values. I propose a nonstandard, dialetheic model of valuation that requires a value to be both true and false as well as neither true nor false. |
| spellingShingle | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Practical ethics Logic Philosophy Dries, M On the logic of values |
| title | On the logic of values |
| title_full | On the logic of values |
| title_fullStr | On the logic of values |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the logic of values |
| title_short | On the logic of values |
| title_sort | on the logic of values |
| topic | Ethics (Moral philosophy) Practical ethics Logic Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT driesm onthelogicofvalues |