A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games
We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessar...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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2009
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| _version_ | 1797099015613972480 |
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| author | Tsomocos, D Voliotis, D |
| author_facet | Tsomocos, D Voliotis, D |
| author_sort | Tsomocos, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:17:44Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ddceab25-0b4f-4eb6-a901-af72217c113f |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:17:44Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ddceab25-0b4f-4eb6-a901-af72217c113f2022-03-27T09:27:37ZA Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market GamesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ddceab25-0b4f-4eb6-a901-af72217c113fSaïd Business School - Eureka2009Tsomocos, DVoliotis, DWe analyze a market game where traders are heterogeneous with respect to their rationality level and have asymmetric information. The market mechanism results into a statistical equilibrium, where traders randomise among their available actions due to their limited rationality. We provide a necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games, when traders become more informed and increasingly more rational. |
| spellingShingle | Tsomocos, D Voliotis, D A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title | A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title_full | A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title_fullStr | A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title_full_unstemmed | A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title_short | A Necessary and Sufficient Condition for Convergence of Statistical to Strategic Equilibria of Market Games |
| title_sort | necessary and sufficient condition for convergence of statistical to strategic equilibria of market games |
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