| Summary: | <p>There is a distinction between two different ways in which people’s interests might figure as inputs into the reasoning that determines verdicts of moral permissibility and impermissibility. Their interests may receive a certain priority in that reasoning, as for example the interests of the people whose lives are at stake in the famous <i>Bystander</i> example should. Or they may not, as for example the interests in spectacle that people watching on the sidelines might have should not.</p>
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<p>A theory of rights needs to make sense of this distinction. One of the chief attractions of Alec Walen’s theory of rights in <i>The Mechanics of Claims and Permissible Killing in War</i> is that it promises to do so, thanks to the concept of a claim that it introduces and the structural role this concept plays in the theory. However, I argue here that the substantive content of the mechanics of claims – in particular, a principle Walen calls the ‘welfare principle’ – privileges welfare interests to a degree that threatens to undermine the theory’s advantages. I consider and reject some ways of modifying the welfare principle so as to avoid this implication, suggesting that their failure raises much deeper questions of moral theory that must be confronted if the mechanics of claims is to make good on its promise.</p>
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