Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets.
The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generate wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment cont...
| Hlavní autor: | |
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| Médium: | Journal article |
| Jazyk: | English |
| Vydáno: |
1997
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| _version_ | 1826300700518252544 |
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| author | Malcomson, J |
| author_facet | Malcomson, J |
| author_sort | Malcomson, J |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generate wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment contracts that induce efficient specific investments by both firm and employee are problematic so it makes sense, wherever possible, for one side to make all such investments. With private information, fixed wages may induce fewer inefficient separations than employment at will. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:21:09Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:def7a564-29a3-4d23-8196-c51b30ca4cb4 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:21:09Z |
| publishDate | 1997 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:def7a564-29a3-4d23-8196-c51b30ca4cb42022-03-27T09:35:50ZContracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets.Journal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:def7a564-29a3-4d23-8196-c51b30ca4cb4EnglishDepartment of Economics - ePrints1997Malcomson, JThe implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generate wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment contracts that induce efficient specific investments by both firm and employee are problematic so it makes sense, wherever possible, for one side to make all such investments. With private information, fixed wages may induce fewer inefficient separations than employment at will. |
| spellingShingle | Malcomson, J Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title | Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title_full | Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title_fullStr | Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title_full_unstemmed | Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title_short | Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets. |
| title_sort | contracts hold up and labor markets |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT malcomsonj contractsholdupandlabormarkets |