Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets.
The implications for labor markets of contracts to avoid investments without wages increasing with tenure. With turnover costs, fixed but renegotiable wages can protect general investments by both firm and employee, and generate wage stickiness without adversely affecting employment. Employment cont...
Príomhchruthaitheoir: | Malcomson, J |
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Formáid: | Journal article |
Teanga: | English |
Foilsithe / Cruthaithe: |
1997
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