International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment
We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home e...
| Main Authors: | , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Blackwell Publishing
1996
|
| Subjects: |
| _version_ | 1826300743202635776 |
|---|---|
| author | Leahy, D Neary, J |
| author_facet | Leahy, D Neary, J |
| author_sort | Leahy, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D; subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:21:48Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:df2b5728-9307-4558-950b-27d127946ea4 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:21:48Z |
| publishDate | 1996 |
| publisher | Blackwell Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:df2b5728-9307-4558-950b-27d127946ea42022-03-27T09:37:34ZInternational R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitmentJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:df2b5728-9307-4558-950b-27d127946ea4EconomicsEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetBlackwell Publishing1996Leahy, DNeary, JWe examine optimal industrial and trade policies in a series of dynamic oligopoly games in which a home and a foreign firm compete in R&D; and output. Alternative assumptions about the timing of moves and the ability of agents to commit intertemporally are considered. We show that the home export subsidy, R&D; subsidy and welfare are higher when government commitment is credible than in the dynamically consistent equilibrium without commitment. Commitment thus yields welfare gains (though they are small) but so does unanticipated reneging, whereas reneging which is anticipated by firms yields the lowest welfare of all. |
| spellingShingle | Economics Leahy, D Neary, J International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title | International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title_full | International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title_fullStr | International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title_full_unstemmed | International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title_short | International R&D; rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| title_sort | international r amp d rivalry and industrial strategy without government commitment |
| topic | Economics |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT leahyd internationalrampdrivalryandindustrialstrategywithoutgovernmentcommitment AT nearyj internationalrampdrivalryandindustrialstrategywithoutgovernmentcommitment |