Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case
Can the law develop workable, litigable rules to measure the duty and standard of care owed by financial intermediaries to clients? In this chapter we examine the legal control of credit rating agencies, using this as a test case to demonstrate how financial intermediation poses a set of difficult p...
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| Format: | Book section |
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Hart Publishing
2017
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| _version_ | 1797099473069932544 |
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| author | Whelan, A Getzler, J |
| author2 | Barker, K |
| author_facet | Barker, K Whelan, A Getzler, J |
| author_sort | Whelan, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Can the law develop workable, litigable rules to measure the duty and standard of care owed by financial intermediaries to clients? In this chapter we examine the legal control of credit rating agencies, using this as a test case to demonstrate how financial intermediation poses a set of difficult problems for the common law tradition to solve. We discuss the origins and functions of rating agencies as information intermediaries, and show how the rating industry slid into pathology in the mid-2000s. We then outline recent developments in case law and statute grappling with rating agency liability, and show that it remains unclear whether increased or maybe decreased liability would best serve the interests of a healthy financial sector. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:24:13Z |
| format | Book section |
| id | oxford-uuid:e0001eff-5324-4f14-9051-f06b604737ec |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:24:13Z |
| publishDate | 2017 |
| publisher | Hart Publishing |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e0001eff-5324-4f14-9051-f06b604737ec2022-03-27T09:43:31ZCommon law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test caseBook sectionhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_3248uuid:e0001eff-5324-4f14-9051-f06b604737ecSymplectic Elements at OxfordHart Publishing2017Whelan, AGetzler, JBarker, KFairweather, KGrantham, RCan the law develop workable, litigable rules to measure the duty and standard of care owed by financial intermediaries to clients? In this chapter we examine the legal control of credit rating agencies, using this as a test case to demonstrate how financial intermediation poses a set of difficult problems for the common law tradition to solve. We discuss the origins and functions of rating agencies as information intermediaries, and show how the rating industry slid into pathology in the mid-2000s. We then outline recent developments in case law and statute grappling with rating agency liability, and show that it remains unclear whether increased or maybe decreased liability would best serve the interests of a healthy financial sector. |
| spellingShingle | Whelan, A Getzler, J Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title | Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title_full | Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title_fullStr | Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title_full_unstemmed | Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title_short | Common law and the constraint of financial markets: credit rating agencies as a test case |
| title_sort | common law and the constraint of financial markets credit rating agencies as a test case |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT whelana commonlawandtheconstraintoffinancialmarketscreditratingagenciesasatestcase AT getzlerj commonlawandtheconstraintoffinancialmarketscreditratingagenciesasatestcase |