| Čoahkkáigeassu: | It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through <em>misascription</em>, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-<em>ascription</em> of bodily states are, at best, <em>circumstantially</em> immune to error through misidentification relative to 'I' and, at worst, <em>subject to error</em>. Central to my thesis is that, first, 'I' is immune to error through misidentification absolutely, and that if there is any problem with first-person thoughts this cannot be with the self-<em>identification</em> component, but only with the self-<em>ascriptive</em> component. Secondly, the '<em>know who</em>' or '<em>know what</em>', or '<em>know which</em>' requirement is appropriately relevant to considerations of different self-ascriptive properties, and thus its inappropriateness in self-identification does not entail that 'I' may fail to refer and identify.
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