Self-consciousness and the double immunity
It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through <em>misascription</em>, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-<em>ascript...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2000
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| _version_ | 1826301271450058752 |
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| author | Christofidou, A |
| author2 | Royal Institute of Philosophy |
| author_facet | Royal Institute of Philosophy Christofidou, A |
| author_sort | Christofidou, A |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through <em>misascription</em>, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-<em>ascription</em> of bodily states are, at best, <em>circumstantially</em> immune to error through misidentification relative to 'I' and, at worst, <em>subject to error</em>. Central to my thesis is that, first, 'I' is immune to error through misidentification absolutely, and that if there is any problem with first-person thoughts this cannot be with the self-<em>identification</em> component, but only with the self-<em>ascriptive</em> component. Secondly, the '<em>know who</em>' or '<em>know what</em>', or '<em>know which</em>' requirement is appropriately relevant to considerations of different self-ascriptive properties, and thus its inappropriateness in self-identification does not entail that 'I' may fail to refer and identify. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:29:53Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e1e2b7e8-de20-4d07-a285-74eeaca8a639 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:29:53Z |
| publishDate | 2000 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e1e2b7e8-de20-4d07-a285-74eeaca8a6392022-03-27T09:57:18ZSelf-consciousness and the double immunityJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e1e2b7e8-de20-4d07-a285-74eeaca8a639MetaphysicsPhilosophyEnglishOxford University Research Archive - ValetCambridge University Press2000Christofidou, ARoyal Institute of PhilosophyIt is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through <em>misascription</em>, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-<em>ascription</em> of bodily states are, at best, <em>circumstantially</em> immune to error through misidentification relative to 'I' and, at worst, <em>subject to error</em>. Central to my thesis is that, first, 'I' is immune to error through misidentification absolutely, and that if there is any problem with first-person thoughts this cannot be with the self-<em>identification</em> component, but only with the self-<em>ascriptive</em> component. Secondly, the '<em>know who</em>' or '<em>know what</em>', or '<em>know which</em>' requirement is appropriately relevant to considerations of different self-ascriptive properties, and thus its inappropriateness in self-identification does not entail that 'I' may fail to refer and identify. |
| spellingShingle | Metaphysics Philosophy Christofidou, A Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title | Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title_full | Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title_fullStr | Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title_full_unstemmed | Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title_short | Self-consciousness and the double immunity |
| title_sort | self consciousness and the double immunity |
| topic | Metaphysics Philosophy |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT christofidoua selfconsciousnessandthedoubleimmunity |