Self-consciousness and the double immunity
It is accepted that first-person thoughts are immune to error through misidentification. I argue that there is also immunity to error through <em>misascription</em>, failure to recognise which has resulted in mistaken claims that first-person thoughts involving the self-<em>ascript...
Autor principal: | Christofidou, A |
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Outros Autores: | Royal Institute of Philosophy |
Formato: | Journal article |
Idioma: | English |
Publicado em: |
Cambridge University Press
2000
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Assuntos: |
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