A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology
Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incom...
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Cambridge University Press
2021
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| _version_ | 1797111224687656960 |
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| author | Thornley, E |
| author_facet | Thornley, E |
| author_sort | Thornley, E |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Lexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:07:17Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e33cb2a1-4c24-4e8c-aec7-053f90ba2784 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:07:17Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Cambridge University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e33cb2a1-4c24-4e8c-aec7-053f90ba27842023-11-02T08:01:54ZA dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiologyJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e33cb2a1-4c24-4e8c-aec7-053f90ba2784EnglishSymplectic ElementsCambridge University Press2021Thornley, ELexical views in population axiology can avoid the Repugnant Conclusion without violating Transitivity or Separability. However, they imply a dilemma: either some good life is better than any number of slightly worse lives, or else the ‘at least as good as’ relation on populations is radically incomplete. In this paper, I argue that Archimedean views face an analogous dilemma. I thus conclude that the lexical dilemma gives us little reason to prefer Archimedean views. Even if we give up on lexicality, problems of the same kind remain. |
| spellingShingle | Thornley, E A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title | A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title_full | A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title_fullStr | A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title_full_unstemmed | A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title_short | A dilemma for lexical and Archimedean views in population axiology |
| title_sort | dilemma for lexical and archimedean views in population axiology |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT thornleye adilemmaforlexicalandarchimedeanviewsinpopulationaxiology AT thornleye dilemmaforlexicalandarchimedeanviewsinpopulationaxiology |