Evidence disclosure in competitive markets
We introduce a model of competitive equilibrium in a market for a divisible good in which both buyer and seller may possess concealable hard information about the state of the market. When an agent knows the state he or she can verifiably disclose it, but an absence of evidence cannot be proved. Age...
Main Authors: | Eső, E, Wallace, C |
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Format: | Working paper |
Language: | English |
Published: |
University of Oxford
2022
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