On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation
<p>In this thesis I discuss three stylized scenarios of the International Monetary System (IMS): one with floating exchange rates, one with fixed exchange rates and one with closed capital markets. Within the first scenario, I identify two problems of background injustice: the problem of monet...
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| Other Authors: | |
| Format: | Thesis |
| Language: | English |
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2021
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| _version_ | 1824459044931239936 |
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| author | Guajardo Ortega, CC |
| author2 | Laborde, C |
| author_facet | Laborde, C Guajardo Ortega, CC |
| author_sort | Guajardo Ortega, CC |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>In this thesis I discuss three stylized scenarios of the International Monetary System (IMS): one with floating exchange
rates, one with fixed exchange rates and one with closed capital markets. Within the first scenario, I identify two problems
of background injustice: the problem of monetary spillovers and the problem of currency speculation. The first problem
happens because exchange rates are relative to one another, hence, when the central bank of a country applies monetary
policy, it also changes the exchange rate of all other countries vis-à-vis this country. In order to address this problem, I offer
a Limited Regressiveness Principle (LRP) and argue for the creation of a global fund. In order to address the second problem,
I offer a framework of parasitic exploitation, which includes three conditions of build in mechanisms, vulnerability, and
non-proportionality. I argue that the case of currency speculation, is not only a problem of background injustice, but also a
case of parasitic exploitation. Then, I discuss the scenario of fixed exchange rates. I consider two stylized but historical
cases, the Gold Standard and the Reserve Currency Standard. I also consider a hybrid case, the case of the Eurozone. I argue
that the framework of parasitic exploitation can be extended to the stylized fixed scenarios. However, I suggest that both
the principles and the responsibilities that arise in the fixed cases are different from those that arise in the general floating
case. Finally, I address the case of closed capital markets, or financial autarky, such as the system that existed during Bretton
Woods. I argue that a generally open system with embedding institutions - which may include non-extensive capital controls
- is better than a completely closed scenario of extensive capital controls, such as the one that existed during Bretton Woods.</p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:36:42Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:e421ff66-10b2-4913-a31d-7724620e5003 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2025-02-19T04:35:32Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e421ff66-10b2-4913-a31d-7724620e50032025-01-27T08:14:04ZOn the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation Thesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:e421ff66-10b2-4913-a31d-7724620e5003EnglishHyrax Deposit2021Guajardo Ortega, CCLaborde, C<p>In this thesis I discuss three stylized scenarios of the International Monetary System (IMS): one with floating exchange rates, one with fixed exchange rates and one with closed capital markets. Within the first scenario, I identify two problems of background injustice: the problem of monetary spillovers and the problem of currency speculation. The first problem happens because exchange rates are relative to one another, hence, when the central bank of a country applies monetary policy, it also changes the exchange rate of all other countries vis-à-vis this country. In order to address this problem, I offer a Limited Regressiveness Principle (LRP) and argue for the creation of a global fund. In order to address the second problem, I offer a framework of parasitic exploitation, which includes three conditions of build in mechanisms, vulnerability, and non-proportionality. I argue that the case of currency speculation, is not only a problem of background injustice, but also a case of parasitic exploitation. Then, I discuss the scenario of fixed exchange rates. I consider two stylized but historical cases, the Gold Standard and the Reserve Currency Standard. I also consider a hybrid case, the case of the Eurozone. I argue that the framework of parasitic exploitation can be extended to the stylized fixed scenarios. However, I suggest that both the principles and the responsibilities that arise in the fixed cases are different from those that arise in the general floating case. Finally, I address the case of closed capital markets, or financial autarky, such as the system that existed during Bretton Woods. I argue that a generally open system with embedding institutions - which may include non-extensive capital controls - is better than a completely closed scenario of extensive capital controls, such as the one that existed during Bretton Woods.</p> |
| spellingShingle | Guajardo Ortega, CC On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title | On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title_full | On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title_fullStr | On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title_full_unstemmed | On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title_short | On the International Monetary System (IMS): A case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| title_sort | on the international monetary system ims a case of background injustice and parasitic exploitation |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT guajardoortegacc ontheinternationalmonetarysystemimsacaseofbackgroundinjusticeandparasiticexploitation |