Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk
This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...
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| Format: | Working paper |
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University of Oxford
2019
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| _version_ | 1797100493442383872 |
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| author | Meyer, M Moreno de Barreda, I Nafziger, J |
| author_facet | Meyer, M Moreno de Barreda, I Nafziger, J |
| author_sort | Meyer, M |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium which fully reveals the state (a FRE), there exists a robust FRE, i.e. one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, relating the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver, the Min Rule, that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists. Revised January 2019 |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:38:19Z |
| format | Working paper |
| id | oxford-uuid:e4b05d4e-bc9e-4fee-804a-1447283e4a7b |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:38:19Z |
| publishDate | 2019 |
| publisher | University of Oxford |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e4b05d4e-bc9e-4fee-804a-1447283e4a7b2022-03-27T10:18:28ZRobustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talkWorking paperhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_8042uuid:e4b05d4e-bc9e-4fee-804a-1447283e4a7bBulk import via SwordSymplectic ElementsUniversity of Oxford2019Meyer, MMoreno de Barreda, INafziger, JThis paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias vectors. With the supports of the biases represented by cones, we prove that whenever there exists an equilibrium which fully reveals the state (a FRE), there exists a robust FRE, i.e. one in which small deviations result in only small punishments. We provide a geometric condition, the Local Deterrence Condition, relating the cones of the biases to the frontier of the policy space, that is necessary and sufficient for the existence of a FRE. We also construct a specific policy rule for the receiver, the Min Rule, that supports a robust FRE whenever one exists. Revised January 2019 |
| spellingShingle | Meyer, M Moreno de Barreda, I Nafziger, J Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title | Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title_full | Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title_fullStr | Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title_full_unstemmed | Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title_short | Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| title_sort | robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT meyerm robustnessoffullrevelationinmultisendercheaptalk AT morenodebarredai robustnessoffullrevelationinmultisendercheaptalk AT nafzigerj robustnessoffullrevelationinmultisendercheaptalk |