Aristotle on the matter of the elements
<p>This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, <em>genuine<em> elements, i.e.,...
| Egile Nagusiak: | , |
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| Formatua: | Thesis |
| Hizkuntza: | English |
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2009
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| _version_ | 1826301837512278016 |
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| author | Crowley, T Crowley, Timothy J. |
| author2 | Frede, M |
| author_facet | Frede, M Crowley, T Crowley, Timothy J. |
| author_sort | Crowley, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | <p>This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, <em>genuine<em> elements, i.e., the simplest material constituents, of bodies. In particular, I deal with two problems, the first concerning the relationship between the four 'so-called elements' and the primary contraries, hot-cold, dry-wet; and the second concerning the nature of the matter from which the latter come to be. Responses to these problems in the secondary literature tend to conclude that the contraries (usually together with 'prime matter'), are constitutive of the so-called elements. I reject this conclusion. In the first part of this thesis I consider, and dismiss, the alleged evidence that Aristotle denies to fire, air, water, and earth the status of genuine elements, and I argue that the status of the contraries as the differentiae of the elements effectively rules out the possibility that they could be the constituents of the latter. In the second part of this thesis I attempt to unpack Aristotle's assertion at <em>De Gen. et Cor.</em> II. 1 that the matter of the perceptible bodies is that from which the so-called elements come to be. I argue that the matter of the perceptible bodies, although it <em>is</em> that from which the elements come to be, is not the 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that <em>composes</em> the elements. On the contrary, the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', i.e., the constitutive matter of <em>composite</em> bodies, is itself composed of the elements: it is a mixture of the four elements. Thus the latter can be said to come to be 'from' the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', but this must be understood in a non-constitutive sense of 'from'.</em></em></p> |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:38:25Z |
| format | Thesis |
| id | oxford-uuid:e4b90312-72a2-404a-909c-f1cc4761b31e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:38:25Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e4b90312-72a2-404a-909c-f1cc4761b31e2022-03-27T10:18:41ZAristotle on the matter of the elementsThesishttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_db06uuid:e4b90312-72a2-404a-909c-f1cc4761b31eEarly works to 1800Substance (Philosophy)MatterFour elements (Philosophy)Philosophy of natureForm (Philosophy)PhilosophyScience, AncientEnglishPolonsky Theses Digitisation Project2009Crowley, TCrowley, Timothy J.Frede, MMorison, B<p>This thesis is an investigation into the simplest material entities recognised by Aristotle's theory of nature. In general, the position I defend is that the four 'so-called elements' fire, air, water, and earth are, for Aristotle, <em>genuine<em> elements, i.e., the simplest material constituents, of bodies. In particular, I deal with two problems, the first concerning the relationship between the four 'so-called elements' and the primary contraries, hot-cold, dry-wet; and the second concerning the nature of the matter from which the latter come to be. Responses to these problems in the secondary literature tend to conclude that the contraries (usually together with 'prime matter'), are constitutive of the so-called elements. I reject this conclusion. In the first part of this thesis I consider, and dismiss, the alleged evidence that Aristotle denies to fire, air, water, and earth the status of genuine elements, and I argue that the status of the contraries as the differentiae of the elements effectively rules out the possibility that they could be the constituents of the latter. In the second part of this thesis I attempt to unpack Aristotle's assertion at <em>De Gen. et Cor.</em> II. 1 that the matter of the perceptible bodies is that from which the so-called elements come to be. I argue that the matter of the perceptible bodies, although it <em>is</em> that from which the elements come to be, is not the 'matter of the elements', in the sense of a matter that <em>composes</em> the elements. On the contrary, the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', i.e., the constitutive matter of <em>composite</em> bodies, is itself composed of the elements: it is a mixture of the four elements. Thus the latter can be said to come to be 'from' the 'matter of the perceptible bodies', but this must be understood in a non-constitutive sense of 'from'.</em></em></p> |
| spellingShingle | Early works to 1800 Substance (Philosophy) Matter Four elements (Philosophy) Philosophy of nature Form (Philosophy) Philosophy Science, Ancient Crowley, T Crowley, Timothy J. Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title | Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title_full | Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title_fullStr | Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title_full_unstemmed | Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title_short | Aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| title_sort | aristotle on the matter of the elements |
| topic | Early works to 1800 Substance (Philosophy) Matter Four elements (Philosophy) Philosophy of nature Form (Philosophy) Philosophy Science, Ancient |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT crowleyt aristotleonthematteroftheelements AT crowleytimothyj aristotleonthematteroftheelements |