Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Springer
2009
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| _version_ | 1826302005463744512 |
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| author | Elbourne, P |
| author_facet | Elbourne, P |
| author_sort | Elbourne, P |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:40:58Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e58c8936-aedd-46ad-965f-240c41ea950d |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:40:58Z |
| publishDate | 2009 |
| publisher | Springer |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e58c8936-aedd-46ad-965f-240c41ea950d2022-03-27T10:24:52ZWhy propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstancesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e58c8936-aedd-46ad-965f-240c41ea950dEnglishSymplectic ElementsSpringer2009Elbourne, PSoames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this. |
| spellingShingle | Elbourne, P Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title | Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title_full | Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title_fullStr | Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title_full_unstemmed | Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title_short | Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances |
| title_sort | why propositions might be sets of truth supporting circumstances |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT elbournep whypropositionsmightbesetsoftruthsupportingcircumstances |