Why propositions might be sets of truth-supporting circumstances
Soames (Philos Top 15:44–87, 1987, J Philos Logic 37:267–276, 2008) has argued that propositions cannot be sets of truth-supporting circumstances. This argument is criticized for assuming that various singular terms are directly referential when in fact there are good grounds to doubt this.
Main Author: | Elbourne, P |
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Format: | Journal article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Springer
2009
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