Dynamically Stable Sets in Infinite Strategy Spaces.
Evolutionary game theory has largely focused on finite games. Dynamic stability is harder to attain in infinite strategy spaces; Bomze [Bomze, I., 1990. Dynamical aspects of evolutionary stability. Monatsh. Math. 110, 189-206] and Oechssler and Riedel [Oechssler, J., Riedel, F., 2001. Evolutionary d...
1. Verfasser: | Norman, T |
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Format: | Journal article |
Sprache: | English |
Veröffentlicht: |
2008
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