The informativeness of on-line advertising

Sending general advertisements with inflationary claims may attract additional visitors with whom an advertiser is poorly matched. This is costly when ads are priced per-click because many visitors (clickers) will not purchase. This renders per-click advertising particularly conducive to the transmi...

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প্রধান লেখক: Taylor, G
বিন্যাস: Journal article
প্রকাশিত: Elsevier 2011
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author Taylor, G
author_facet Taylor, G
author_sort Taylor, G
collection OXFORD
description Sending general advertisements with inflationary claims may attract additional visitors with whom an advertiser is poorly matched. This is costly when ads are priced per-click because many visitors (clickers) will not purchase. This renders per-click advertising particularly conducive to the transmission of information via ads. The admissibility of information transmission depends not only on advertiser behaviour, but also upon consumers' interpretation of and trust in ads. In less conducive environments, consumers quickly learn to place little stock in the claims they see advertised. This mechanism undermines the ability of advertisers and consumers to communicate under per-impression or per-sale fee structures. Consumers benefit from increased informativeness, but distortions introduced by the market power given to advertisers imply that society may be better-off with no information transmission taking place.
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spelling oxford-uuid:e6bd008f-c2eb-4fd9-b5f1-2ecaea5751902022-03-27T10:33:10ZThe informativeness of on-line advertisingJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e6bd008f-c2eb-4fd9-b5f1-2ecaea575190Symplectic Elements at OxfordElsevier2011Taylor, GSending general advertisements with inflationary claims may attract additional visitors with whom an advertiser is poorly matched. This is costly when ads are priced per-click because many visitors (clickers) will not purchase. This renders per-click advertising particularly conducive to the transmission of information via ads. The admissibility of information transmission depends not only on advertiser behaviour, but also upon consumers' interpretation of and trust in ads. In less conducive environments, consumers quickly learn to place little stock in the claims they see advertised. This mechanism undermines the ability of advertisers and consumers to communicate under per-impression or per-sale fee structures. Consumers benefit from increased informativeness, but distortions introduced by the market power given to advertisers imply that society may be better-off with no information transmission taking place.
spellingShingle Taylor, G
The informativeness of on-line advertising
title The informativeness of on-line advertising
title_full The informativeness of on-line advertising
title_fullStr The informativeness of on-line advertising
title_full_unstemmed The informativeness of on-line advertising
title_short The informativeness of on-line advertising
title_sort informativeness of on line advertising
work_keys_str_mv AT taylorg theinformativenessofonlineadvertising
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