Taking responsibility for responsibility
Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly su...
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Oxford University Press
2019
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author | Levy, N |
author_facet | Levy, N |
author_sort | Levy, N |
collection | OXFORD |
description | Governments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts. |
first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:45:03Z |
format | Journal article |
id | oxford-uuid:e6f12a17-ea8d-4556-ae67-fcc43982fc4c |
institution | University of Oxford |
last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:45:03Z |
publishDate | 2019 |
publisher | Oxford University Press |
record_format | dspace |
spelling | oxford-uuid:e6f12a17-ea8d-4556-ae67-fcc43982fc4c2022-03-27T10:34:42ZTaking responsibility for responsibilityJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e6f12a17-ea8d-4556-ae67-fcc43982fc4cSymplectic Elements at OxfordOxford University Press2019Levy, NGovernments, physicians, media and academics have all called for individuals to bear responsibility for their own health. In this article, I argue that requiring those with adverse health outcomes to bear responsibility for these outcomes is a bad basis for policy. The available evidence strongly suggests that the capacities for responsible choice, and the circumstances in which these capacities are exercised, are distributed alongside the kinds of goods we usually talk about in discussing distributive justice, and this distribution significantly explains why people make bad health choices. These facts suggest that we cannot justifiably hold them responsible for these choices. We do better to hold responsible those who determine the ways in which capacities and circumstances are distributed: they are indirectly responsible for these adverse health outcomes and possess the capacities and resources to take responsibility for these facts. |
spellingShingle | Levy, N Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title | Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title_full | Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title_fullStr | Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title_full_unstemmed | Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title_short | Taking responsibility for responsibility |
title_sort | taking responsibility for responsibility |
work_keys_str_mv | AT levyn takingresponsibilityforresponsibility |