| Summary: | <p>From operating public parks to hosting sporting events, liberal states frequently legislate on leisure. Despite this, liberal political theorists rarely consider what leisure is, why it is important, or when state initiatives dedicated towards leisure are justified. Insofar as they do, they generally think about leisure in terms of free time, providing only a limited resource for answering many of the important questions surrounding leisure. This thesis defends a claim to a more demanding notion of leisure – the condition of performing activities chosen as ends in themselves.</p>
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<p>The thesis establishes the claim to leisure over three parts. In the first part, it develops this more demanding notion of leisure by drawing upon the thought of Aristotle and Marx. It argues that placing this notion at the centre of a normative inquiry into a claim to leisure – ahead of free time – allows the theorist to uncover the reasons that leisure might be important and when state policies dedicated towards leisure might be justified. In the second part, it establishes that citizens of the liberal state have a claim to leisure as a matter of justice through the capability for leisure. This involves endorsing a liberal theory that accommodates capabilities, which I call Nussbaumian liberalism, ahead of more popular forms of liberalism that tend to suit arguments made for free time. In the final part, it asks how this capability ought to be satisfied. The answer depends upon the circumstances, but in all scenarios, leisure requires giving people free time <em>and</em> other things, and in current liberal societies, it requires the state to supply a range of leisure goods far beyond what political theorists (including free time advocates) have previously argued for. In the process, the thesis provides much-needed normative guidance for judging and directing the leisure policies of liberal states.</p>
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