Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unani- mous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group’s sh...

Повний опис

Бібліографічні деталі
Автори: Segal-Halevi, E, Suksompong, W
Інші автори: Lang, J
Формат: Conference item
Опубліковано: International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence 2018
_version_ 1826302413058867200
author Segal-Halevi, E
Suksompong, W
author2 Lang, J
author_facet Lang, J
Segal-Halevi, E
Suksompong, W
author_sort Segal-Halevi, E
collection OXFORD
description We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unani- mous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group’s share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. Our protocols approximate both envy-freeness and maximin-share fairness. As an example, for two groups of agents with additive valuations, our protocol yields an allocation that is envy-free up to one good and gives at least half of the maximin share to at least half of the agents in each group.
first_indexed 2024-03-07T05:47:10Z
format Conference item
id oxford-uuid:e79b1023-ad43-40e5-a952-84c71b054b61
institution University of Oxford
last_indexed 2024-03-07T05:47:10Z
publishDate 2018
publisher International Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence
record_format dspace
spelling oxford-uuid:e79b1023-ad43-40e5-a952-84c71b054b612022-03-27T10:40:05ZDemocratic fair allocation of indivisible goodsConference itemhttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_5794uuid:e79b1023-ad43-40e5-a952-84c71b054b61Symplectic Elements at OxfordInternational Joint Conferences on Artificial Intelligence2018Segal-Halevi, ESuksompong, WLang, JWe study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods to groups of agents. Agents in the same group share the same set of goods even though they may have different preferences. Previous work has focused on unani- mous fairness, in which all agents in each group must agree that their group’s share is fair. Under this strict requirement, fair allocations exist only for small groups. We introduce the concept of democratic fairness, which aims to satisfy a certain fraction of the agents in each group. This concept is better suited to large groups such as cities or countries. We present protocols for democratic fair allocation among two or more arbitrarily large groups of agents with monotonic, additive, or binary valuations. Our protocols approximate both envy-freeness and maximin-share fairness. As an example, for two groups of agents with additive valuations, our protocol yields an allocation that is envy-free up to one good and gives at least half of the maximin share to at least half of the agents in each group.
spellingShingle Segal-Halevi, E
Suksompong, W
Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title_full Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title_fullStr Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title_full_unstemmed Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title_short Democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
title_sort democratic fair allocation of indivisible goods
work_keys_str_mv AT segalhalevie democraticfairallocationofindivisiblegoods
AT suksompongw democraticfairallocationofindivisiblegoods