Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities
I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a c...
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Springer Berlin Heidelberg
2015
|
| _version_ | 1826311987722715136 |
|---|---|
| author | Karos, D |
| author_facet | Karos, D |
| author_sort | Karos, D |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | I propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:19:22Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e835d423-f3fc-40cd-862a-1b4b5df7a861 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T08:19:22Z |
| publishDate | 2015 |
| publisher | Springer Berlin Heidelberg |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e835d423-f3fc-40cd-862a-1b4b5df7a8612024-01-15T15:11:41ZStable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalitiesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e835d423-f3fc-40cd-862a-1b4b5df7a861EnglishORA DepositSpringer Berlin Heidelberg2015Karos, DI propose a model of coalitional bargaining with claims in order to find solutions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities. I show that, for each such game, payoff configurations exist which will not be renegotiated. In the ordinal game derived from these payoff configurations, a core stable partition can be found, i.e. a partition in which no group of players has an incentive to jointly change their coalitions. |
| spellingShingle | Karos, D Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title | Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title_full | Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title_fullStr | Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title_full_unstemmed | Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title_short | Stable partitions for games with non-transferable utility and externalities |
| title_sort | stable partitions for games with non transferable utility and externalities |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT karosd stablepartitionsforgameswithnontransferableutilityandexternalities |