Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence
We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institu...
| Main Authors: | , , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Published: |
2003
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| _version_ | 1797101268391428096 |
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| author | Noe, T Gillette, A Rebello, M |
| author_facet | Noe, T Gillette, A Rebello, M |
| author_sort | Noe, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | We examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:49:25Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e859d83f-7f96-40b1-a86e-9254bd58a33e |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:49:25Z |
| publishDate | 2003 |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e859d83f-7f96-40b1-a86e-9254bd58a33e2022-03-27T10:46:02ZCorporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidenceJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e859d83f-7f96-40b1-a86e-9254bd58a33eSaïd Business School - Eureka2003Noe, TGillette, ARebello, MWe examine voting by a board designed to mitigate conflicts of interest between privately informed insiders and owners. Our model demonstrates that, as argued by researchers and the business press, boards with a majority of trustworthy but uninformed "watchdog" agents can implement institutionally preferred policies. Our laboratory experiments strongly support this conclusion. Our model also highlights the necessity of penalties on insiders when there is dissension among board members. However, penalties for dissent appeared to have little impact on the experimental outcomes. |
| spellingShingle | Noe, T Gillette, A Rebello, M Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title_full | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title_fullStr | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title_full_unstemmed | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title_short | Corporate board composition, protocols, and voting behavior: Experimental evidence |
| title_sort | corporate board composition protocols and voting behavior experimental evidence |
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