Contracts for the National Health Service.

This paper reviews the implications of the economic theory of contracts for contracting in National Health Service (NHS), focusing on contracts to maintain quality standards while keeping costs down.

Bibliografiske detaljer
Main Authors:	Chalkley, M, Malcomson, J
Format:	Working paper
Sprog:	English
Udgivet:	Department of Economics (University of Southampton) 1996

Lignende værker

Contracts for the National Health Service.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)

Contracting for Health Services with Unmonitored Quality.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1998)

Contracting for Health Services When Patient Demand Does Not Reflect Quality.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1998)

Contracts and Competition in the NHS.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contracts and Competition in the NHS.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)

Government Purchasing of Health Services.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1998)

Government Purchasing of Health Services.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (2000)

Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings.
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (2002)

Cost Sharing in Health Service Provision: An Empirical Assessment of Cost Savings.
af: Malcomson, J, et al.
Udgivet: (2001)

Cost sharing in health service provision: an empirical assessment of cost savings
af: Malcomson, J, et al.
Udgivet: (2001)

Contracting in the NHS Legal and Economic Issues.
af: Barker, K, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Contracts Bargaining for Flows of Goods and Services in Finite Terms.
af: Macleod, B, et al.
Udgivet: (1991)

Competition in NHS quasi-markets
af: Chalkley, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1996)

Relational Incentive Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2010)

Individual Employment Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1986)

Individual Employment Contracts.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1998)

Relational incentive contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2010)

Relational incentive contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2013)

Incomplete Contracts and Involuntary Unemployment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1985)

Relational contracts and specific training
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2014)

Health Service Gatekeepers.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2003)

Health Service Gatekeepers.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2004)

Health service gatekeepers
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2003)

Health Service Gatekeepers.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2003)

Trade Union Labour Contracts: An Introduction.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1987)

Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2021)

Contracts, Hold-Up, and Labor Markets.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1997)

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2015)

Contract Inefficiency, Wages and Employment: An Assessment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1992)

Contract Inefficiency, Wages and Employment: An Assessment.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1993)

Contracts, Hold-Up and Labor Markets.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1997)

Relational incentive contracts with productivity shocks
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2012)

Contract Theory and Incentive Compatibility.
af: Coles, M, et al.
Udgivet: (1989)

Relational contracts and specific training
af: Malcomson, JM
Udgivet: (2014)

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2012)

Relational incentive contracts with persistent private information
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (2015)

Rank-Order Contracts for a Principal with Many Agents.
af: Malcomson, J
Udgivet: (1986)

Uncertainty, investment and productivity with relational contracts
af: Malcomson, JM
Udgivet: (2023)

Contract bargaining with symmetric information
af: MacLeod, WB, et al.
Udgivet: (1995)