Trust, belief, and the second-personal
Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for an...
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| Format: | Journal article |
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Routledge
2018
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| _version_ | 1826302882987638784 |
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| author | Simpson, T |
| author_facet | Simpson, T |
| author_sort | Simpson, T |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | Cognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:54:12Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:e9f230e6-5d72-49a2-889c-de64c88981d0 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T05:54:12Z |
| publishDate | 2018 |
| publisher | Routledge |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:e9f230e6-5d72-49a2-889c-de64c88981d02022-03-27T10:58:00ZTrust, belief, and the second-personalJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:e9f230e6-5d72-49a2-889c-de64c88981d0Symplectic Elements at OxfordRoutledge2018Simpson, TCognitivism about trust says that it requires belief that the trusted is trustworthy; non-cognitivism denies this. At stake is how to make sense of the strong but competing intuitions that trust is an attitude that is evaluable both morally and rationally. In proposing that one's respect for another's agency may ground one's trusting beliefs, second-personal accounts provide a way to endorse both intuitions. They focus attention on the way that, in normal situations, it is the person whom I trust. My task is to develop an account of the latter insight without the controversial theoretical commitments of the former. I propose a functional account for why the second and third-personal ‘systems’ operate not just in parallel, but in tandem, in support of a cognitivist account of trust. |
| spellingShingle | Simpson, T Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title | Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title_full | Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title_fullStr | Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title_full_unstemmed | Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title_short | Trust, belief, and the second-personal |
| title_sort | trust belief and the second personal |
| work_keys_str_mv | AT simpsont trustbeliefandthesecondpersonal |