The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches
The fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises a powerful, reliable and fast infrastructure to match artificial intelligence and Internet of Things developments. But its rollout has stirred strong political tensions around the prominent role that Chinese providers might be allowed to play in...
| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | Journal article |
| Language: | English |
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Oxford University Press
2021
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| _version_ | 1797110008721178624 |
|---|---|
| author | Radu, R Amon, C |
| author_facet | Radu, R Amon, C |
| author_sort | Radu, R |
| collection | OXFORD |
| description | The fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises a powerful, reliable and fast infrastructure to match artificial intelligence and Internet of Things developments. But its rollout has stirred strong political tensions around the prominent role that Chinese providers might be allowed to play in building the new networks. Between 2018 and 2020, a few countries have banned - partially or totally - the use of networking equipment produced by Huawei and ZTE, while others have mandated technical and security reviews to mitigate the risks associated with Chinese-origin components in the national 5G infrastructure. This article provides a thematic analysis of the security arguments and policy options emerging in the early days of the 5G debates. Based on key high-level statements, parliamentary debates and legislative acts published from mid-2018 to 2020, we examine perceived risks and threats surfacing in the public discourse, as well as the main regulatory directions emerging in seven countries. Our analysis shows policy alignment across multilateral commitments such as the European Union (EU) or the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. While selected EU member states lean towards risk-based governance and adaptive policies, Five Eyes nations opt for pre-emptive bans of 5G Chinese vendors, revealing path-dependent strategies for the sector. We conclude by discussing the policy reversal experienced by the UK in 2020 and the consolidation of new governance approaches for 5G infrastructure. |
| first_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:49:13Z |
| format | Journal article |
| id | oxford-uuid:ea348ebc-66a2-44a7-84e2-91d7cfa773c3 |
| institution | University of Oxford |
| language | English |
| last_indexed | 2024-03-07T07:49:13Z |
| publishDate | 2021 |
| publisher | Oxford University Press |
| record_format | dspace |
| spelling | oxford-uuid:ea348ebc-66a2-44a7-84e2-91d7cfa773c32023-06-29T06:42:44ZThe governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approachesJournal articlehttp://purl.org/coar/resource_type/c_dcae04bcuuid:ea348ebc-66a2-44a7-84e2-91d7cfa773c3EnglishSymplectic ElementsOxford University Press2021Radu, RAmon, CThe fifth generation (5G) wireless technology promises a powerful, reliable and fast infrastructure to match artificial intelligence and Internet of Things developments. But its rollout has stirred strong political tensions around the prominent role that Chinese providers might be allowed to play in building the new networks. Between 2018 and 2020, a few countries have banned - partially or totally - the use of networking equipment produced by Huawei and ZTE, while others have mandated technical and security reviews to mitigate the risks associated with Chinese-origin components in the national 5G infrastructure. This article provides a thematic analysis of the security arguments and policy options emerging in the early days of the 5G debates. Based on key high-level statements, parliamentary debates and legislative acts published from mid-2018 to 2020, we examine perceived risks and threats surfacing in the public discourse, as well as the main regulatory directions emerging in seven countries. Our analysis shows policy alignment across multilateral commitments such as the European Union (EU) or the Five Eyes intelligence alliance. While selected EU member states lean towards risk-based governance and adaptive policies, Five Eyes nations opt for pre-emptive bans of 5G Chinese vendors, revealing path-dependent strategies for the sector. We conclude by discussing the policy reversal experienced by the UK in 2020 and the consolidation of new governance approaches for 5G infrastructure. |
| spellingShingle | Radu, R Amon, C The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title | The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title_full | The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title_fullStr | The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title_full_unstemmed | The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title_short | The governance of 5G infrastructure: between path dependency and risk-based approaches |
| title_sort | governance of 5g infrastructure between path dependency and risk based approaches |
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